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9 Balancing ethical criteria for the 
recruitment of gamete donors 
Guido Pennings, Effy Vayena and Kamal Ahuja 
Introduction 
Patients and clinics are constantly searching for donors. The increas­
ing gap between supply and demand in most countries shows beyond 
doubt that the current systems are unable to attract a sufficient num­
ber of donors. The first suggestion for a solution is always the same: 
let's pay. However, payment for body material is, at least in Europe, 
generally rejected on ethical grounds. Several alternative modes of 
compensation are currently applied. Still, the efforts made by clinics 
and/or governments to increase the donor pool are fairly limited. In 
order to curb commercialization, a number of countries do not allow 
clinics to take their own initiatives to attract donors. This entails that 
the task lies completely with the government. However, compared to 
the campaigns for blood and organs, governments show very little 
interest in organizing widespread awareness campaigns for gamete 
donation. Moreover, the rare campaigns that are set up are so lit­
tle advertised that they might as well not be done. Only seldom are 
special organizations (such as the National Gamete Donation Trust 
in the UK) set up to alleviate the shortage of gamete donors. The 
most likely explanation for this reticence is that most governments 
and responsible institutions are not convinced of the moral status of 
the procedure and as a consequence do not want to associate them­
selves with this topic. 
The practice of gamete donation is a complex system in which mul­
tiple ethical rules, legal restrictions and medical facts intermingle. 
Things are further complicated by the fact that there are many different 
types of donors. The different categories are based on dimensions with 
ethical, social and psychological consequences: gamete type (oocyte 
and sperm donors), anonymity (known, identifiable and anonymous 
donors) and remuneration (volunteer, commercial and patient donors) 
(Purewal and van den Akker, 2009). Given space restrictions, we will 
focus on the major findings and trends. 
!50 
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Anonymity 
In the last decade, several European countries have adopted legislation 
to impose gamete donor identifiability (Blyth and Frith, 2009). Many 
people in countries where identifiability is the legal rule blame the 
abolishment of anonymity for the current shortage of gamete donors. 
Anonymity as a rule plays a different role in donor recruitment than pay­
ment: it does not attract donors but facilitates their recruitment. Many 
practitioners believe that the abundance of sperm donors in Denmark 
and egg donors in Spain is only possible because of the anony1nity there. 
In countries \vhere anonymity was abandoned (e.g. Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands), there has been a sharp drop in the number 
of donors (at least initially). It would have been surprising if this had not 
been the case. A certain type of donor is recruited through the rules, 
mainly regarding payment and anonymity. When these rules change, 
the donor population will also change (Pennings, 2005a). It vvas per­
fectly predictable that when existing donors were asked whether they 
would still donate if the anonymity rule were abandoned, the majority 
(but notably less in Australia and New Zealand) said they would cease 
to donate (Daniels, 2007). A new rule means that a new population 
should be addressed in the campaigns so that new donors who agree 
with these rules can be attracted. 
A1any people have a rather simplistic view of the gamete donation 
practice. They believe that one can alter one rule and leave the rest 
as they are. The rules, however, can best be compared with Mikado 
pick-up sticks: peripheral rules can be changed relatively easily, but cen­
tral rules, such as anonymity and payment, will almost inevitably bring 
about and require other additional changes (Pennings, 2010). So, in 
sun1mary, the abolishment of anonymity has had the expected negative 
effect on the number of donors in the countries that originally respected 
anonymity. But newly adapted (and most likely expensive) campaigns 
are able to regain the same level of donation that existed during the 
pre-identifiability period, as was demonstrated in the UK (Blyth and 
Frith, 2008; Pacey, 2010). Still, reaching the pre-identifiability level 
may not be sufficient to cover the demand since a peripheral rule con­
nected to the altered anonymity rule may have a highly limiting effect 
on the use of the donor gametes. This peripheral rule is the possibility 
for the donor to set upper limits on the number of children born from 
their donation, an option that does not exist in systems that work with 
anonymous donors. 
Anonymity in essence regulates the interaction between donor 
and recipients. Its most important consequence is that it closes the 
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relationship completely: after the donation, no party can contact 
another party. This is an aspect that can be very highly appreciated 
both by the donor and by the recipients. Anonymity prevents all kinds 
of possible complications and conflicts regarding rights, duties and 
so on in the future. If this closure is a precondition for a candidate 
donor to donate, then abolishing this rule will reduce the number of 
donors. T'his cannot be the end of the argument, though, since donors 
may request all kinds of things. Society's attitude towards donation of 
body material is not solely focused on attracting the highest number 
of donors: society wants to recruit the highest number of donors \Vhile 
respecting a number of ethical rules. Every rule excludes a number of 
donors but that in itself is not a sufficient reason to abandon the rule. 
A country that believes that a child has a right to kno\V its genetic 
origin, cannot reintroduce anonymity. Countries such as France that 
put more emphasis on social parenthood can, on the contrary, impose 
anonymity. Given the fact that both sides in the debate have strong 
arguments for their position, it seems reasonable for governments not 
to take sides and allow the participants to decide how they want to 
organize their family and \Vhat kind of relationship they \Vant with 
the other persons involved. This can be done by adopting a 'double 
track' system (Pennings, 1997). In this system, both the donor and 
the recipients decide whether they want to be identifiable or anonym­
ous. Beside the fact that this is a liberal structure that allows compe­
tent participants to decide for themselves, it does not exclude potential 
donors and thus promotes recruitment. In Belgium, for instance, the 
general rule is anonymity, but this rule can be broken when both donor 
and recipient(s) agree to be known to each other. Research has shown 
that, when given the choice, the decision on known or anonymous 
donation is a matter of negotiation bet\veen the parties and depends 
on aspects such as a genetic link with the donor and the importance 
of l<nowing the donor as a person. At the same time, both donor and 
recipients may feel uncomfortable with the close presence of the other 
(and all the possible complication this entails) and opt for the anonym­
ous exchange (Baetens et al., 2000). The double track policy represents 
the best attempt to balance the rights of donors and recipients. The 
decision about the best interests of the offspring is, like in many other 
instances, left to the future parents. 
Payment 
The question of payment for body material has been around for dec­
ades (Titmuss, 1970). Whether gamete donors should receive financial 
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remuneration for their donation still is a major controversy in medically 
assisted reproduction. In the general perception, w donate means to gi·ve 
a gifr. A great part of the controversy stems from the different views 
of \vhat the 'gift' is and \Vhether it remains a 'gift' even if a price tag is 
attached to it. An interesting twist in the debate is the role that remu­
neration can or should play in recruiting donors. Some data have shown 
a decrease in the number of donors when payment ceases (Anonymous, 
2010). The evidence from countries ( like France) that forbid all pay­
ment clearly shows, however, that people still come forward to donate 
even if no remuneration is offered (Guerin, 1998). Other studies have 
concluded that a recruitment strategy that targets the right kind of 
donor can successfully bypass the compensation issue (Daniels et al., 
2006). The core questions are whether gan1ete donation should be a 
purely altruistic act and to what extent or under what conditions finan­
cial compensation is morally acceptable. Lack of consensus on whether 
a donor should receive any money at all and, if yes, what this should be 
for (i.e. payment for a service, compensation for lost earnings or simply 
minimal reimbursement of costs incurred by the donor through the 
act of donation such as travel costs to the donation site, etc.) is evident 
in the variety of laws and guidelines. The differences in practice are 
vast. In the USA donor payment is not regulated and clinics operate 
on a free market model. Egg donors in particular may receive huge 
amounts of money. A recent study of recruitment advertisements for 
oocyte donors in US college newspapers reported fees up to US$50,000 
(Levine, 2010). 
The American Society for Reproductive l\1edicine's (ASRM) guide­
lines on the issue of oocyte donation recommend financial compensa­
tion but propose that up to US$5,000 is a reasonable compensation and 
set a maximum upper limit of US$10,000 (Ethics Committee of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2007). This sum is based 
on a calculation of estimated hours spent for oocyte donation multiplied 
by US$60-70 which is the hourly compensation for sperm donation. 
A survey of American clinics in 2007 showed that the average pay­
ment for oocyte donors (in clinics which arc men1bers of the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology) did not exceed US$5,000. Semen 
donors are also compensated, but in most places payment is based on 
sample acceptability (quality and sperm count) and the amount varies 
between US$50 and US$100 (Almeling, 2007). The situation is dis­
tinctly different in neighbouring Canada, which forbids payment to 
gamete donors according to legislation passed in 2004. The law allows 
reimbursement of expenses for receipted expenditures, which includes 
for sperm donors travel expenses (such as transportation, meals and 
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accommodation), child care costs (for attending clinic appointment), 
counselling services, health care services (provided and prescribed by 
health care providers); compensation for egg donors includes all the 
above and, in addition, the costs for medication. 
In Europe the situation is highly variable. In contrast to the ASRM, the 
professional organization of European fertility specialists, the European 
Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) views the 
'direct payment for reproductive material as unethical'. It does, however, 
accept 'reasonable compensation for the effort of the donor' (ESHRE 
Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002). A survey of European states 
conducted by the EU's Health and Consumer Protection Directorate 
General found that most states regulate non-remuneration by law in 
the context of preventing organ trading and trafficking as dictated 
by the EU Tissues and Cells Directive 2004/23/EC. However, even 
within these states, some allow reimbursement of expenses and others 
of inconveniences. The remaining states have no regulation or operate 
on non-binding national and international guidelines (EU Health and 
Consumer Protection, Directorate General, 2006). Specific amounts 
of payment are not commonly mentioned in the guidelines and most 
tend to use vague language. Nevertheless, there is general acceptance 
that costs incurred due to donation (i.e. travel costs and medication) 
should be reimbursed. However, there exists considerable disagreement 
on whether people should be paid for the risk they take, the inconveni­
ence they experience and the service they provide. 
These different approaches and practices have been justified by the 
use of arguments based either on moral principles or pragmatism and 
they evolve around the issue of protection of the donor, the offspring 
or society as a whole. In the following sections we summarize the argu­
ments for and against payment of gamete donors. 
Donors should not be paid 
Article 21 of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine (1997) clearly states that 'the human body and its 
parts as such should not give rise to financial gain'. This is a widely 
accepted position and the same point appears in other regulatory docu­
ments and guidelines (Nuffield Council, 1995; Directive 2004/23/EC). 
The rejection of payment is based on the argument that the body and 
its parts should not be treated as commodities because this denies their 
dignity and sacred worth (Holland, 2001). Moreover, gametes with the 
Balancing ethical criteria for recruiting donors 155 
potential to become embryos and possibly persons come even closer to 
the notion of selling and buying humans. The 'human dignity' argu­
ment is particularly appealing to regulators and it is widely used in eth­
ical debates about regulating biomedicine and biotechnology (Caulfield 
and Brownsword, 2006). However, it remains a vague argument because 
there is no clear definition of human dignity and it is therefore hard to 
show which aspects of dignity are violated in the case of paid donors. 
The argument goes on to raise the concern of exploitation. If a mon­
etary gain can be made, people in financial need will be more tempted 
to sell their gametes. Depending on the price they are offered, those 
individuals may end up underestimating the physical and psycho­
logical risks of gamete donation (Steinbock, 2004). This argument 
is stronger in the case of oocyte donation as the risks associated with 
ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval are much higher than for 
semen donation. Financially disadvantaged individuals, such as young 
women, are more vulnerable and therefore more at risk of exploitation. 
Vulnerability, however, is a complex concept and it is difficult to define 
precisely all its nuances. Is an athletic, beautiful, Ivy League university 
student with very high SAT scores a vulnerable individual when she is 
offered over US$35,000 for her oocytes? Is a young, beautiful, educated 
Indian woman vulnerable if she is offered US$1,000 for her oocytes? 
It could be argued that when there is financial remuneration, the risk 
of exploitation increases. Whether there actually is exploitation can be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Still, prohibition of payment is a 
relatively easy way to protect vulnerable individuals (Rao, 2006). 
Payment, especially when the amount is high, may also jeopard­
ize informed consent, which is frequently seen as a safeguard against 
exploitation (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1995). The donor in need 
may underestimate the risks of donation and, if operating under undue 
inducement, the consent is not free and voluntary as it ought to be. 
Beyond the arguments that address the need to protect donors, a 
second set of arguments focuses on the welfare of the child. One prag­
matic argument against payment raises the concern that prospective 
donors who donate just for money might not disclose important infor­
mation about their medical history and might put potential offspring at 
risk (Yee, 2009). Psychological issues or abusive behaviour have been 
quoted as examples (Schover et al., 1992). However, standard medical 
and psychological screening of donors would normally suffice to avoid 
this problem. Another argument in this context states that children 
who find out that they were conceived as a result of a financial trans­
action might be psychologically adversely affected (Johnson, 1997). 
There is limited evidence to support or refute this argument but there 
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is evidence suggesting that, in case of disclosure to the offspring, the 
'gift nature' of the donation is important (Thorn, 2007). 
A broader argument against payment is that it may exacerbate inequi­
ties. Those who can afford to pay for gametes will be more likely to 
receive treatment and to have children. This point is linked to a eugen­
ics argument. In a free market for gametes, human traits and charac­
teristics \:vill be valued selectively. The price will not be compensation 
for the risk or the inconvenience of the donor but for the trait itself (i.e. 
being blond, tall or athletic) (Schonfeld, 2003). Furthermore, if people 
can pay more for certain genetic traits, well-off couples \vill be able to 
buy 'better' eggs and sperm, while poorer couples will be unable to 
select and will be consigned to fate. This argmnent has been fuelled by 
the payments that have been made for specific traits to egg donors in 
the USA. However, this argument does not hold for European countries 
where a maximum limit is imposed on the amount that can be offered 
to the donor. As a consequence, many poor, uneducated women present 
themselves as candidate donors. Moreover, most European clinics do 
not allow the recipients to choose their donor. 
The altruism argument is further extended to the societal level. The 
Nuffield Council report argues for the need to encourage the 'altruistic 
culture' in our societies. If individuals with purely altruistic motives 
can be recruited for donation through recruitment strategies, there will 
be less need for commercial donors (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
1995). Gamete donation should not be perceived as business. On the 
contrary, it should be an act of altruism within a culture that rewards 
altruism. This raises an interesting point that is rarely discussed, namely 
the amount of money that the clinic should be allowed to ask from the 
recipients of the donor gametes. According to the non-commercial­
ization rule, the clinic should not charge 1nore than the expenses they 
made to recruit the donors and to obtain and store the gametes. There 
is surprisingly little interest from regulators in this point. Furthermore, 
there is also the issue of how fertility treatment and reproductive medi­
cine is perceived by the broader public. The argument here points to 
the 'bad image' if such services are perceived to be just big business. 
This reputation would erode public trust in science and medicine. 
Donors should be paid 
People who argue for payment of gamete donors do not necessarily 
argue in favour of a free market approach. On the contrary, even the 
proponents of payment heavily criticize the phenomena observed in 
the USA with special egg donors receiving large sums of money for 
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1:heir donations (Levine, 2010). Most people arguing in favour of pay­
ing donors call for reasonable amounts. The difficulty, however, is to 
determine what constitutes 'reasonable' payment and how this should 
be calculated. 
The main argument for payment is fairness. Donors should be 
compensated for the risk they take, the burden of the procedures, the 
inconvenience, the discomfort they experience and the time they spend 
for the donation. This also happens for other services in our societies 
(ivlacklin, 1996). In fact, a parallel has been drawn between gamete 
donors and clinical trial volunteers. Payment to health volunteers in 
clinical trials for the temporary donation of their bodies to medical 
research is widely accepted (although the prices vary dramatically). If 
people are compensated for taking a risk and bearing the burden in that 
case, why not for donating their gametes? Paying reasonable fees for the 
service of donation would also prevent unfair differences in the com­
pensation, such as the ones observed today where donors with certain 
traits end up receiving more money. The money will be paid for the ser­
vice and not for the product. The American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine guidelines for compensation of egg donors explicitly state 
that 'compensation should not vary according to the planned use of the 
oocytes (e.g. research or clinical care), the number or quality of oocytes 
retrieved, the outcome of prior donation cycles, or the donor's ethnic 
or other personal characteristics' (Ethics Committee of the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2007). 
Another popular and pragmatic argument for payment relates to 
the impact of payment on recruitment. There is a shortage of gam­
ete donors worldwide and financial incentives will most likely increase 
the number of donors. Conversely, lack of financial incentives will dis­
courage donors. Several studies have been undertaken to establish \Vhat 
motivates people to donate gametes and consequently what the best 
strategies to recruit them should look like. While it is not easy to draw 
a clear conclusion (even systematic reviews of such studies cite ser­
ious limitations), it is evident that there is a wide spectrum of motives 
(Purewal and van den Akker, 2009). Gamete donors are donating for 
purely altruistic reasons, for altruistic and financial or just financial 
reasons. Undoubtedly, financial incentives are important. Some recent 
studies from Canada where payment for gamete donation has been 
abolished pointed to a dramatic reduction in sperm donation. Of the 
forty sperm banks that existed in Canada, only one is still in operation 
(Anonymous, 201 0). 
In the broader context of payment for donation, an alternative 
approach has been proposed: the so-called 'all inclusive' model (Craft 
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and Thornhill, 2005). In this model, payment for specific expenses, 
inconvenience and so on is replaced by a predetermined sum of money 
that covers everything. As a consequence, payment is legitimate but 
mixed with expenses. No exact figure is proposed and obviously, if such 
a model were to be adopted, it would have to be calculated based on 
local indexes. In theory, this transparent arrangement will deter illegal 
transactions and exploitation. In addition, it will reduce the administra­
tive load that clinics face when processing receipts for reimbursement 
of expenses. If the sum is reasonable (to avoid the concerns raised earl­
ier about undue inducement), this presents a middle ground approach 
(Pennings, 2005a). 
Summarizing the different practices and arguments for and against 
donor payment, three major models emerge: the market model (unlim­
ited sums paid to donors) based on the rule of supply and demand; 
the reimbursement model (reimbursement of expenses incurred by the 
donor) based on the belief that altruism is the only morally accept­
able motive for donation; and the reimbursement/compensation model 
(reimbursement of expenses and compensation but too low to consti­
tute undue inducement) based on the idea that services are compen­
sated for and that it is fair for gamete donors to be compensated as well. 
In the discussion on payment of healthy volunteers for clinical trials, 
Dickert and Grady discussed three very similar models: the market 
model (unlimited payment), the reimbursement model (only expenses 
paid) and the 'wage model'. The wage model is based on the notion 
that clinical research requires little skill but time, effort and incon­
venience. Therefore, research subjects should be paid hourly wages 
similar to those for unskilled labour (Dickert and Grady, 1999). They 
rightly argued that with the wage approach, the risk of undue induce­
ment is significantly reduced, as subjects would have alternative options 
for the same financial gain; the principle of fairness would not be vio­
lated as similar people would be treated similarly; and standardization 
among clinical research centres in terms of subject payment could be 
achieved. 
In our view, a compensation scheme based on the 'wage model' for 
clinical trial subjects can be applied to gamete donors. Such an approach 
would address the major concern of undue inducement since the gain 
cannot be that high and donors must have preferred to donate rather 
than to do something else for the same money. It would also address 
the concern of unfairness since donors would receive something for the 
service they provide and would avoid the issue of valuing certain gen­
etic traits more than others. Finally, donors would not be compensated 
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for the gametes themselves (seen as a commodity) but for the time they 
spend and the inconveniences they encounter. 
Egg-sharing 
Egg sharers are fertility patients who have been diagnosed as subfer­
tile and who are considering IVF. The concept of egg-sharing was first 
raised in the UK in 1992 by three women patients from the north­
east of England who proposed sharing their oocytes with women look­
ing for treatment with donor eggs. Against a national background of 
too few egg donors and a more local background of too few funds for 
any further treatment, they asked if they could exchange their eggs in 
return for another cycle of IVF treatment. The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) reviewed the concept extensively 
and, after many debates and public consultations, in 2000 incorporated 
egg-sharing into the Code of Practice. 
The ethical claims of egg-sharing have been the subject of a long and 
exhaustive debate over the past twenty years. The detractors argued 
that subsidized treatment is remuneration in all but name, that treat­
ment outcome favours the recipient (who pays) and that the sharer is 
giving up half of her eggs before she has even become pregnant (thereby 
reducing her chances). The first concerns arose from an interpretation 
of the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and its accom­
panying Code of Practice for fertility clinics, which specifically declared 
'that no money or other benefit shall be given or received in respect of 
any supply of gametes or embryos'. The authorities and other clinics 
were concerned that subsidized IVF treatment in return for donating 
a random portion of eggs could be seen as 'payment'. However, subse­
quent studies of the motivation of egg sharers indicate that financial 
reward is not their main incentive; a survey found egg sharers in the UK 
to be 'well informed women who carefully consider the issues involved' 
(Ahuja et al., 1998) and disapproved of cash rewards. They were also 
well educated, middle class and, as judged by their moving accounts 
and goodwill messages to the future children of their recipients, totally 
committed to the underlying theme of mutual help (Ahuja et al., 1998). 
However, despite such repeated findings, the controversies were not 
resolved until 2004 when a review for the HFEA concluded that egg­
sharing was morally acceptable (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, 2005). 
The main problem with egg-sharing as an intermediate system is 
that it falls between two paradigms: altruistic donation and commercial 
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transaction. One has to decide, through analogical reasoning, whether 
the intermediate positions (reimbursement, payment in kind etc.) link 
best with one rather than the other paradigm. The underlying idea is 
that once we have decided this point, we know whether or not it is 
acceptable. We are confronted with the conviction that the donation 
of body material is only acceptable if it is purely altruistically moti­
vated. The argument against payment has overshot itself and has been 
extended to any kind of benefit that the donor might receive. Any bene­
fit is sufficient to disqualify the system. However, it is one thing to ban 
payment to prevent commodification of the human body. It is quite 
another to forbid other types of benefits that do not have this effect. 
Two counterarguments are worth mentioning here. First, to forbid any 
benefit is a very strict position. One could adopt the alternative position 
that an act is morally praiseworthy to the extent that it is motivated by 
the need of the other(s). The latter would fit better with the empirical 
fact that most (if not all) actions are done for more than one reason. 
Second, some people seem to mix up moral praiseworthiness and moral 
acceptability. These are different standards and, from a moral point of 
view, it is more important to be able to decide acceptability. Our start­
ing point is that benefits can be offered (i.e. it is morally acceptable) as 
incentives for people to donate as long as these incentives do not lead to 
the commercialization and commodification of the human body. 
It is this pragmatic altruism that defines the place of egg-sharing 
in ART today, for the simple fact is that egg-sharing simultaneously 
solves the principal problems of the sharer and the recipient: the former 
receives the IVF treatment she needs but cannot afford and the lat­
ter obtains the eggs which she can no longer produce. Many patients 
perceive the system as a win-win procedure (Blyth, 2004). 1\tloreover, 
neither has a treatment which she otherwise need not have had. The 
risks - such as ovarian hyperstimulation - are still there, of course. 
But now there is a difference in the relativity of those risks because the 
donor is also a patient, and not merely a donor. The former has a vested 
interest in the treatment that goes beyond pure altruism but, as the 
studies have found, egg sharers do not perceive it to be blatant commer­
cialisn1. Finally, the benefits are conferred equally between the recipi­
ent and the donor: both parties have an almost equally high chance of 
a successful pregnancy (Ahuja and Simons, 2005). Other studies also 
confirmed that egg-sharing does not reduce the chance of success of 
either party (Thum et al., 2003). 
According to one group, egg-sharing in exchange for a free cycle (or 
part of a cycle) of IVF is a compensation that far surpasses the amount 
allowed for other donors. The other group argues that a treatment cycle 
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should not be considered as payment and thus should not be compared 
�,;:irh the other types of compensation. The question is whether the free 
cycle should be recalculated in a monetary amount. Depending on the 
country and clinic, the amount can be several thousand euro. This is a 
-:onsiderable sum of money that may, according to the chairman of the 
British 1\1edical Association Ethics Committee, 'constitute an induce­
ment that may jeopardize the validity of the woman's informed con­
sent' (Anonymous, 2005). However, the question whether something is 
undue inducement or whether it is payment is not the same. Even if we 
agree that there is a certain degree of inducement, that does not mean 
that it is payment. This is important because payment has other rep­
rehensible aspects beside undue inducement such as exploitation and 
commodification. 
There are indications that some egg sharers are reluctant to do so 
but that they go ahead because of their desire to have a child (Rapport, 
2003). The prediction has been made that if these women could obtain 
their treatment without offering their oocytes, egg-sharing would be 
less attractive for them (Blyth, 2004). Corroborating evidence for this 
statement was provided by a legal experiment in Belgium. In July 2003 
Belgium started to provide full reimbursement for six IVF cycles. Since 
that date, the number of egg sharers dropped by approximately 70 per 
cent (Pennings and Devroey, 2006). The conclusion that can be drawn 
from this reaction is that these women were mainly motivated by the 
cost reduction. It does not show that altruism was nor part of at least 
some of these women's motives. The studies on the motivarions of egg 
sharers show that they have multiple reasons for sharing. The sharp 
decline in egg sharers nevertheless shows that a number of these women 
do not part with their eggs fully voluntarily. Some might consider this 
to be a sufficient reason to forbid the practice. However, this is too easy 
an answer. When the broader picture is taken into account, one should 
realize that even the women who feel strong pressure are not helped or 
protected by forbidding the practice. The ideal solution would be to 
prevent a situation where people in need of infertility treatment have to 
donate their oocytes to receive treatment. This can be done by reducing 
the out-of-pocket costs of the treatment for the patients either through 
health insurance or through direct cost reduction. 
Reciprocity 
The scarcity of donor gametes stimulates the discussion on acceptable 
systems of recruitment. Other fields equally confronted with a shortage 
of donor material, such as blood and organs) may serve as an inspiration. 
--·-:n 
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In fact, there already exists a large variety of systems within the practice 
of oocyte donation, mainly the result of attempts to alleviate the short­
age. Fundamental rules like anonymity were reconsidered and in some 
systems abandoned because of the shortage. Direct donation, where the 
recipient knows the donor and vice versa, is an option both for gametes 
and organs. For oocytes (and organs) cross-donation is applied: a donor 
recruited by recipient X donates to recipient Y and vice versa. In France 
this system is called 'personalised anonymity' since it allows the pro­
tection of the donor's anonymity. Such systems are important because 
they reveal morally relevant deviations from the ideal 'pure altruism'. 
Cross-donation, for instance, introduces an element of exchange (i.e. 
something is asked in return): donor A gives to a certain recipient b 
in exchange for an equivalent gift by donor B recruited by recipient b 
to recipient a who recruited donor A. A new variant of this system has 
been called 'mirror exchange' and was originally invented and applied 
in the fertility clinic Stichting Geertgen in the Netherlands (Pennings, 
2005b). Very simply put, the partner of the person who needs gametes 
donates in exchange for the gametes of the opposite sex. The man of a 
woman who needs oocytes donates sperm in exchange for the oocytes 
donated by the woman of a man who needs sperm. This scheme is then 
broadened so that the donated gametes are directed into an oocyte and 
sperm pool and allocated to candidate recipients on the waiting list. For 
practical and moral reasons, this 'indirect' system is preferable. Persons 
who donate are awarded bonus points that are attributed to their part­
ners, who then move up on the waiting list. This system, like cross­
donation, holds a quid pro quo element that conflicts with the idea of 
pure altruism. More importantly, the system is based on the principle of 
fairness. According to this principle, a person is obligated to contribute 
his or her fair share of the costs if he or she has voluntarily accepted 
the benefits conferred by the cooperative scheme (Simmons, 1979). In 
other words, a person who accepts donor gametes as part of his or her 
parental project as a couple, should, if he or she fulfils the medical and 
genetic conditions, also contribute to the system from which he or she 
benefits. Moreover, the system is also open to single women and lesbian 
couples since it does not matter who reciprocates; it can be the person 
who benefits herself or her female partner. However, this system cannot 
rely exclusively on the principle of reciprocity. Some partners will be 
rejected as donors because of medical and/or genetic contraindications. 
This will be the case, for instance, for older women. Non-contributors 
should, on the basis of the bonus points they receive for waiting time, 
medical urgency and so on, still have the possibility to receive gametes, 
but they may have to wait longer than those who contribute. 
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The mirror exchange system has a considerable number of advan­
:ages: more donors will be recruited; the benefit for the donor ( less 
,,·airing time) is strictly non-commercial; the female donor is also a 
patient and thus undergoes the medical risks for the stimulation in part 
for her own benefit (like egg sharers); contributors can make good their 
obligation to reciprocate; the system is compatible with the identifi­
ability of donors; infertile couples are easier to motivate; and, finally, 
people who need donor gametes for their own family-building are best 
informed about and prepared for the psychological, social and ethical 
ramifications involved in gamete donation (Pennings, 2007). 
Most people have to get used to the underlying idea, despite the fact 
rhat reciprocity as a rule of justice is universally accepted. Three major 
counterarguments can be distinguished. First, there exists the chance 
that the recipient becomes pregnant while the donor does not, which 
may lead to psychological problems. Besides the fact that in most coun­
tries it is unlikely that the donor will ever know about the outcome 
of the treatment of the recipients, the system can easily be adapted to 
accommodate this objection by allowing people who find it difficult 
to live with this possibility to postpone their donation. This can be 
done by allowing them to come back only after their own pregnancy. 
The second argument focuses on the voluntariness of the donation. 
Just as for the question of altruism, one should avoid an almost abso­
lute interpretation of the ethical criteria. Every type of reward, bene­
fit or incentive can be interpreted as a kind of threat to voluntariness. 
Still, offering a reduction in waiting time can hardly be considered as 
'an offer one cannot refuse'. This danger might be an additional rea­
son for not imposing strict reciprocity (where only people who donate 
have access to the waiting list). However, while voluntariness refers to 
the donors being free from coercion, there is one form of coercion that 
cannot be avoided here: the fact that recipients of gametes have a moral 
obligation to donate. If they benefit from the system, they are morally 
obliged to reciprocate. 
The final problem with the exchange is the asymmetry between 
oocyte and sperm donation. However, whether or not there is an imbal­
ance depends on the criteria with which one measures. Although the 
medical efforts and risks differ between the two types of gamete dona­
tion, the psychosocial aspects are comparable. Moreover, both donors 
(as a couple) receive what they need in order to build a family. Again, the 
solution may be found in an adaptation of the procedure. The imbal­
ance can be reduced by introducing a form of egg-sharing: the woman 
who donates her eggs receives a free IVF cycle instead of an intrauter­
ine insemination with donor sperm. This reduces the waiting time (the 
'7�\i'j 
164 Guido Pennings, Ejfy Vayena and Kama! Ahuja 
treatment coincides with the donation) and increases her chances of 
success. Nlore elaborate adaptations can be introduced if considered 
necessary. 
Although the system was presented almost five years ago, there is very 
little enthusias1n for it. Only the Working Party on Sperm Donation 
Services in the UK has recommended that 'research on sperm shar­
ing schen1es should be facilitated to permit further evaluation of this 
option' (British Fertility Society, 2008). Many people seem to prefer 
the violation of the payment rule rather than a system that abides by 
a fundamental rule of justice. Moreover, there is evidence that the 
system works. In an Italian clinic, 80 per cent of the women whose 
partner needed donor sperm accepted sharing their oocytes. In 2001 
this clinic introduced a systen1 which guaranteed women who needed 
donor eggs that they would receive them within 8 months (without 
donation the mean waiting time vvas 2 years) if their male partner 
donated spenn. Approximately 60 per cent of the men accepted, and 
in one year they recruited 30 new semen donors from the sample of 
partners (Ferraretti et al., 2006). The data from Stichting Geertgen in 
the Netherlands indicate that, between August 2006 and May 2007, 
54 couples received counselling for mirror exchange. This resulted 
in 18 sperm donors and 22 oocyte donors of vvhich 12 opted for the 
egg-sharing option (a free immediate IVF cycle instead of intrauterine 
insemination). 
Conclusion 
The recruitment of gamete donors is a complex issue. The patients, 
the professionals and governments have to make an effort to tackle the 
problem. Governments play a crucial role in this task, either by impos­
ing regulation of gamete donation (which frequently comes down to 
introducing restrictions) or by adopting a laissez-faire approach. In most 
European countries governments want to keep control over the whole 
procedure and the rules governing it. They make it their responsibility 
through regulation. At the moment they are found wanting. Very little 
money and effort is spent on awareness campaigns for gamete donation. 
Hovvever, the practical aspects are only secondary to the real issue: in 
which ethical framework do we, as a society, place assisted reproduc­
tion with donor gametes? To answer that question, we need a broad 
societal debate. It would also require a sustained effort to change the 
ambiguity towards gamete donation that still lives in society and thus 
indirectly hampers donor recruitment. Moreover, we urgently need a 
more critical analysis of ethical standards that are brought forward. 
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Altruism and voluntariness are no absolute criteria. A detailed analysis 
of the precise conditions and rules of a particular system may reveal 
that they fall within the range of morally acceptable variants. Just as 
in the fields of organ and blood donation, we need creativity in design­
ing ne\v syste1ns and flexibility in the application of existing systems if 
we want to get anywhere close to a reasonable coverage of the need for 
donor gametes. 
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